Zuckert has written an intriguing book, whether taken in its exoteric form, as indicated by the title and introduction, as a detached and balanced account of the response to Plato of five “postmodern” thinkers, or in its esoteric form, as indicated by the assignment of the three central chapters to Strauss, as an exposition and defense of Strauss’s account of the truth about the human good. Even if her accounts of the other four are, for many readers, the honey on (...) the rim of the cup of bitter Straussian medicine, the honey is no less carefully presented than the medicine. While the focus is on each thinker’s response to Plato, Zuckert gives sufficient background exposition to explain the motivations, contexts, and goals of the return to Plato in each case. (shrink)

Davis's theme is how philosophy is both partially constitutive of and a model for dealing with certain fundamental tensions at the heart of politics. His mode of commentary involves noticing textual perplexities and using them to shed light on his theme.

The title theme is explored in seven chapters, five of which are revisions of previously published papers. As sketched in the introduction, the central claim is that the dialogues not only always present their explicit themes in a context of "finitude, limitation or negation", but also depict three different responses to such finitude, "domination, submission, or an acknowledgment of the finitude which transforms it into possibility", of which the latter is to be preferred. Moreover, subsequent chapters argue that this mode (...) of presentation is a form of irony which is not merely a literary device or a tactic of political prudence or of pedagogical method, but a reflection of a core tenet of Platonic philosophy, that is, that while the whole has an arche which is in principle intelligible, the finitude and erotic character of human nature render any complete or adequate grasp of that arche humanly impossible. Consequently, the philosophic enterprise, insofar as it is engaged in a necessarily unsuccessful striving for an unattainable goal, partakes of certain elements of tragedy, including the tragic sense that such striving is somehow ennobling. Yet insofar as it yields to the temptation to believe that its goal is attainable, it runs the risk of turning comic in its ignorance of its own limitations. Hence it seems to be self-knowledge about its own finitude which makes the philosophic life finally neither tragic nor comic. (shrink)

Davis aims to rescue the Poetics from its initial appearance as a book merely about the art of poetry understood as imitation, without imposing upon it a "borrowed significance" beyond Aristotle's intention. This involves three major claims: the Poetics is about the fundamental structure of human action, it is also about human reason or thought, and Aristotle's silence about these alleged topics can be explained.

Rosen's web is woven out of a warp of laborious textual commentary and a woof of excursuses, which develop three main issues. Two of these concern the Eleatic Stranger's differences from Socrates--on the character of the method of division and on the end of politics. The third concerns the distinction and relationship between technê and phronêsis in politics. Rosen's penchant for scattering the excursuses through the commentary with apparent randomness and his lack of clarity about which of the three--Stranger, Plato, (...) or Rosen--is being assigned responsibility for any particular claim make it difficult to piece together a coherent account of what he wants to say on these three issues. (shrink)

Griswold's book belongs in that tradition of Plato scholarship which insists that the form of a Platonic dialogue as dialogue must be taken seriously in interpreting it. This means that Platonic anonymity, Platonic and Socratic irony and the interplay between words and deeds, among other things, must be taken into account.

In the last few years it has become fashionable to 'rethink' the heritage of the western secularist modernity and claim that it is, basically, Christian. One possibility of proving this thesis is to show that the founding fathers of secularism themselves argued from an - at least implicitly - Christian point of view, above all when setting up the normative standards for politics. One such deliberately secular founding father is Thomas Hobbes, and contrary to Christian or religious interpretations of his (...) political philosophy two things can be shown: firstly his political philosophy doesn't depend upon religion or religious commitments and, furthermore, the underlying systematic arguments in favour of a political theology are not plausible, let alone effective. (shrink)

In the last few years it has become fashionable to 'rethink′ the heritage of the western secularist modernity and claim that it is, basically, Christian. One possibility of proving this thesis is to show that the founding fathers of secularism themselves argued from an – at least implicitly – Christian point of view, above all when setting up the normative standards for politics. One such deliberately secular founding father is Thomas Hobbes, and contrary to Christian or religious interpretations of his (...) political philosophy two things can be shown: firstly his political philosophy doesn′t depend upon religion or religious commitments and, furthermore, the underlying systematic arguments in favour of a political theology are not plausible, let alone effective. (shrink)

O texto volta-se ao estudo da noção de epieikeia (equidade) na tradição aristotélica, procedendo-se à análise do instituto e a uma tentativa crítica de conceituação, destacando-se o problema da generalidade da lei e da singularidade dos casos. Ainda, vê-se brevemente a epieikeia na obra de Tomás de Aquino.

This article builds upon the distinction between pluralism and plurality, the latter in the sense of variety or diversity. Plurality is an empirical fact, such as the biological diversity of the human species. In contrast, pluralism is a normatively underpinned social pattern according to which the diversity of interests, opinions, values, ideas, etc., of individuals and groups is recognized as a constitutive element of a political order. Pluralism can materialize only if a political order is not based upon the claim (...) of one undisputable truth. An embryonic form of pluralism through law emerged in ancient Greece with the institution of courts in which the parties to a legal dispute could argue over what the law said and hence officially present divergent meanings of justice. For the modern development the separation of law and justice was a major step towards pluralism insofar as the authority of the polity and the binding force of the law were no longer based upon the contention of one exclusive truth – auctoritas, non veritas facit legem. This Hobbesian principle banned religious, moral, philosophical and political discourses to the pre-political domain of privacy and secrecy from which pluralism could not result. Referring to the distinction between regulative and constitutive norms I submit that only the latter, not the former, can function as sources of pluralism. (shrink)

It is a widely supported claim that liberal democratic institutions should treat citizens with equal respect. I neither dispute nor champion this claim, but investigate how it could be fulfilled. I do this by asking, as a sort of litmus test, how liberal democratic institutions should treat with respect citizens holding minority convictions, and thereby dissenting from a deliberative output. The first step of my argument consists in clarifying the sense in which liberal democracies have a primary concern for the (...) respectful treatment of citizens qua self-legislating persons. Taking the second step, I address critically the common tendency in the literature to concentrate on what I have termed the ex ante legem phase, focusing solely on the structure of institutionalized decision-making processes. I submit, rather, that the principle of equal respect for persons demands more of liberal democratic institutions to enhance citizens' chances to give voice to their consciences and influence, on that ground, the formulation of the rules to which they should conform. Fulfilling this commitment requires democratic theorizing to go beyond the ex ante legem phase and regard forms of ex post legem contestation as an extension of citizens' right to political participation. Against this backdrop, I take the third and last step and argue that a promising way forward consists in the adoption of an ex post legem version of conscientious exemptionism, granting citizens a conditional moral right to request exemptions on the grounds of conscience from certain controversial legal and political provisions. (shrink)

In this article a case is made for considering the liturgy as theological norm par excellence. The case is built up by relying on an emphatic current of thought within the field of liturgical studies, namely the ‘liturgical theology’ as it was developed by Alexander Schmemann, Aidan Kavanagh, and David W. Fagerberg. After presenting the concept of ‘liturgical theology’ and the context out of which it emerged, its major characteristics are discussed. Particular attention is devoted to the radicalness of their (...) position. It can be called radical because the reversal of the relation between doctrine and liturgy is by no means evident for the vast majority of modern believers and theologians. However, ‘liturgical theology’ claims that it is not doctrine which determines liturgy but liturgy which determines doctrine. According to liturgical theologians, the liturgy is not simply the ritual expression of the content of faith, but itself theology, even theologia prima . Correspondingly, liturgical theologians point to the original wording of the famous adage lex orandi lex credendi , which is the following: ut legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi . Whereas the usual formulation suggests equality and mutual dependence, the original context lays bare a clear priority of the rule of prayer over the rule of faith. In the final part of the article I explore some avenues to the evaluation of ‘liturgical theology’. I argue that there is need for a more profound philosophical underpinning and historical adequacy. But nevertheless the idea that the liturgy constitutes a theological norm stands firmly and should be considered far more broadly and seriously among contemporary systematic theologians. (shrink)

One of the most important pieces of evidence which we possess concerning the judicial rights of Roman provincials, particularly their status in relation to the governor's tribunal, is provided by Cicero's brief outline of those provisions of the lex Rupilia, the Sicilian provincial charter, which dealt with judicial administration. The passage reads as follows: Siculi hoc iure sunt ut, quod civis cum cive agat, domi certet suis legibus, quod Siculus cum Siculo non eiusdem civitatis, ut de eo praetor iudices ex (...) P. Rupili decreto, quod is de decem legatorum sententia statuit, quam legem Rupiliam vocant, sortiatur. Quod privatus a populo petit ant populus a privato, senatus ex aliqua civitate qui iudicet datur, cum alternae civitates reiectae sunt; quod civis Romanus a Siculo petit, Siculus index, quod Siculus a civi Romano, civis Romanus datur; ceterarum rerum selecti iudices ex conventu civium Romanorum nr000ni solent. (shrink)

sola scripturarum ars est, quam sibi omnes passim uindicent: ‘scribimus indocti doctique poemata passim’ [Hor. Epist. 2.1.117]. hanc garrula anus, hanc delirus senex, hanc soloecista uerbosus, hanc uniuersi praesumunt, lacerant, docent, antequam discant. alii adducto supercilio grandia uerba trutinantes inter mulierculas de sacris litteris philosophantur, alii discunt—pro pudor!—a feminis, quod uiros doceant, et, ne parum hoc sit, quadam facilitate uerborum, immo audacia disserunt aliis, quod ipsi non intellegunt. taceo de meis similibus, qui si forte ad scripturas sanctas post saeculares litteras (...) uenerint et sermone conposito aurem populi mulserint, quicquid dixerint, hoc legem dei putant nec scire dignantur, quid prophetae, quid apostoli senserint, sed ad sensum suum incongrua aptant testimonia, quasi grande sit et non uitiosissimum dicendi genus deprauare sententias et ad uoluntatem suam scripturam trahere repugnantem. quasi non legerimus Homerocentonas et Vergiliocentonas ac non sic etiam Maronem sine Christo possimus dicere Christianum, quia scripserit: ‘iam redit et uirgo, redeunt Saturnia regna, iam noua progenies caelo demittitur alto’ [Verg. Ecl. 4.6–7], et patrem loquentem ad filium: ‘nate, meae uires, mea magna potentia solus’ [Verg. Aen. 1.664], et post uerba saluatoris in cruce: ‘talia perstabat memorans fixusque manebat’ [Verg. Aen. 2.650]. puerilia sunt haec et circulatorum ludo similia, docere, quod ignores, immo, et cum stomacho loquar, nec hoc quidem scire, quod nescias. (shrink)

This paper is a sequel to my 'Theological Misinterpretations of Current Physical Cosmology' (Foundations of Physics [1996], 26 (4); revised in Philo [1998], 1 (1)). There I argued that the Big Bang models of (classical) general relativity theory, as well as the original 1948 versions of the steady state cosmology, are each logically incompatible with the time-honored theological doctrine that perpetual divine creation ('creatio continuans') is required in each of these two theorized worlds. Furthermore, I challenged the perennial theological doctrine (...) that there must be a divine creative cause (as distinct from a transformative one) for the very existence of the world, a ratio essendi. This doctrine is the theistic reply to the question: 'Why is there something, rather than just nothing?' I begin my present paper by arguing against the response by the contemporary Oxford theist Richard Swinburne and by Leibniz to what is, in effect, my counter-question: 'But why should there be just nothing, rather than something?' Their response takes the form of claiming that the a priori probability of there being just nothing, vis-à-vis the existence of alternative states, is maximal, because the non-existence of the world is conceptually the simplest. On the basis of an analysis of the role of simplicity in scientific explanations, I show that this response is multiply flawed, and thus provides no basis for their three contentions that (i) if there is a world at all, then its 'normal', natural, spontaneous state is one of utter nothingness or total non-existence, so that (ii) the very existence of matter, energy and living beings constitutes a deviation from the allegedly 'normal', spontaneous state of 'nothingness', and (iii) that deviation must thus have a suitably potent (external) divine cause. Related defects turn out to vitiate the medieval Kalam Argument for the existence of God, as espoused by William Craig. Next I argue against the contention by such theists as Richard Swinburne and Philip L. Quinn that (i) the specific content of the scientifically most fundamental laws of nature, including the constants they contain, requires supra-scientific explanation, and (ii) a satisfactory explanation is provided by the hypothesis that the God of theism willed them to be exactly what they are. Furthermore, I contend that the theistic teleological gloss on the 'Anthropic Principle' is incoherent and explanatorily unavailing. Finally, I offer an array of considerations against Swinburne's attempt to show, via Bayes's theorem, that the existence of God is more probable than not. (shrink)

We have surveyed various recent European opinions on Germ-Line engineering. The majority express more or less severe reservations about any interventions on the human Germ-Line, including therapeutic ones. However, they are divided over the pragmatic, or categorical-ethical nature of the relevant arguments. This split reflects two competing views of technology. The ‘pessimistic’ one is deeply concerned by the slippery slope leading from bona fide therapeutic applications of genetic engineering to eugenic practices. It insists that, if anything can defend us against (...) these evils, it must be a set of strong, ethically-based prohibitions. The other, ‘optimist’ view is more confident in the discriminating powers of societal regulation. We argue for the latter view and suggest that the pragmatic arguments brought to this debate are less problematic than the ethical ones. (shrink)

La filosofía de la historia se ha debatido durante siglos en una estéril lucha entre idealistas y materialistas. El libro de Ignacio Ellacuría es un intento de superar esa dicotomía clásica. Tomando como punto de partida algunos conceptos fundamentales de la filosofía de Zubiri, Ellacuría cree posible asumir y a la vez criticar ambos extremos, desde una actitud más realista. De ahí el título del libro. Es importante destacar que la historia, para Ignacio Ellacuría, es el lugar de realización de (...) la ética. La historia no está hecha, se construye, es un proceso de creación de posibilidades humanas, y, en tanto que tal, una labor ética. La tesis de Zubiri de que el hombre tiene que hacerse cargo de la realidad, en Ellacuría se transforma en esta otra: el ser humano está obligado a encargarse de la realidad, y a cargar con ella. Este es el imperativo ético. Imperativo que, por otra parte, no sólo le obliga individualmente al hombre, en el reducto de la propia conciencia, al modo del idealismo, ni tampoco sólo en tanto que miembro de una clase social, como en el marxismo, sino como sujeto a la vez individual y específico, como miembro a la vez solitario y solidario de la especie humana. La obra póstuma de Ignacio Ellacuría constituye sin duda su más ingente trabajo intelectual en el campo de la filosofía, y representa, por su calidad y contenido, una pieza clave para comprender no solamente su producción estrictamente filosófica, sino también su pensamiento teológico y socio-político. (shrink)

Contemporary psychiatry maintains the myth that it is value neutral by appeal to modern medical science for both its diagnostic categories and its therapeutic interventions, leaving the impression that it relies on reason—that is to say, reason divorced from tradition—to master human nature. Such a practice has a certain way of characterizing and defining humanity's lapses from acceptable human behavior—a lapse from human being. The modern practice of psychiatry applies a particular notion (largely influenced by Enlightenment ideals) of scientific instrumentation (...) to the human person in order to diagnose the ailment and manufacture a corresponding treatment in keeping with a hidden conception of human biological flourishing. This covert vision is an impoverished (and possibly dangerous) one. As much as the practice of psychiatry is constrained by the goals of the dominant moral tradition of our day, it becomes a tool (or technique) for achieving the transient and partial ends of modern individualism. Given this truncated view of human nature and human end, modern psychiatry fails to attend comprehensively to the unity of a life, missing altogether the essential relevance of character formation, and thereby forfeiting excellence in human flourishing. (shrink)

Objectives: Evidence based patient choice seems based on a strong liberal individualist interpretation of patient autonomy; however, not all patients are in favour of such an interpretation. The authors wished to assess whether ideals of autonomy in clinical practice are more in accordance with alternative concepts of autonomy from the ethics literature. This paper describes the development of a questionnaire to assess such concepts of autonomy.Methods: A questionnaire, based on six moral concepts from the ethics literature, was sent to aneurysm (...) patients and their surgeons. The structure of the questionnaire was assessed by factor analysis, and item reduction was based on reliability.Results: Ninety six patients and 58 surgeons participated. The questionnaire consisted of four scales. Two of the scales reflected the paternalistic and consumerist poles of the liberal individualist model, one scale reflected concepts of Socratic autonomy and of procedural independence, and the fourth scale reflected ideals of risk disclosure.Discussion: The Ideal Patient Autonomy Scale is a 14 item normative instrument. It is clearly distinct from the generally used psychological preference questionnaires that assess preferences for physician-patient roles. (shrink)

In The Idea of a Social Science Winch, argues that, sociology is more properly conceived as a branch of philosophy than of empirical science. Winch falls victim here to the Humean assimilation of the empirical to the generalizable. He notes that much of our talk about social practice is in terms of conventions, so that explanations of social action can be given without recourse to statistical or experimental findings. But such talk depends nonetheless on the accuracy and detail with which (...) the situations in which actions occur are? recorded, and this is surely an empirical enterprise. It is the misleading conception of sociology as a discipline, characterized by common procedures, that leads Winch to espouse the assimilation of sociology to conceptual inquiry. We need to see instead that sociology embraces a group of questions and subjects so loosely connected that it would be mistaken to speak of, and idle to project, a procedure common to all of them. (shrink)

De Sousa's comprehensive two-part review of a diversity of contemporary approaches to the study of consciousness is highly welcome. He makes us aware of a proliferation of theoretical and empirical approaches targeting a common theme, but diverging in many ways. He skilfully accomplishes a classification of kinds of approach, identification of the main representatives, their contributions, and respective limitations. However, he does not show how the desired integration could be accomplished. Besides summarising De Sousa's efficient analytical work, I make critical (...) comments and briefly report my contribution for the integration project. (shrink)

Edited with New Translation by Richard McKirahan With a New Preface by Malcolm Schofield This book is a revised and expanded version of A.H. Coxon's full critical edition of the extant remains of Parmenides of Elea—the fifth-century B.C. philosopher by many considered "one of the greatest and most astonishing thinkers of all times." Coxon's presentation of the complete ancient evidence for Parmenides and his comprehensive examination of the fragments, unsurpassed to this day, have proven invaluable to our understanding of the (...) Eleatic since the book's first publication in 1986. This edition, edited by Richard McKirahan and with a new preface by Malcolm Schofield, is released on the 100th anniversary of Coxon's birth. This new edition for the first time includes English translations of the testimonia and of any Ancient Greek throughout the book, as well as an English/Greek glossary by Richard McKirahan, and revisions by the late author himself. The text consists of Coxon's collations of the relevant folios of manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus, Proclus and Simplicius and includes all extant fragments, a commentary, the testimonia, a complete list of sources, linguistic parallels from both earlier and later authors, and the fullest critical apparatus that has appeared since Diels’ _Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta _. The collection of testimonia includes the philosophical discussions of Parmenides by Plato, Aristotle and the Neoplatonists, most of which had been omitted by Diels. The introduction discusses the history of the text, the language and form of the poem, Parmenides’ use and understanding of the verb ‘to be’, his place in the history of earlier and later philosophy and the biographical tradition. In the commentary Coxon deals in detail with both the language and the subject matter of the poem and pays full attention to Parmenides’ account of the physical world. The appendix relates later Eleatic arguments to those of Parmenides. (shrink)

Brendel and Miller (2008) take the most distinctive commitment in their pragmatic approach to be treating ethical principles as having a hypothetical status. I am sympathetic to a pragmatic approac...

The overgeneration argument attempts to show that accepting second-order validity as a sound formal counterpart of logical truth has the unacceptable consequence that the Continuum Hypothesis is either a logical truth or a logical falsehood. The argument was presented and vigorously defended in John Etchemendy’s The Concept of Logical Consequence and it has many proponents to this day. Yet it is nothing but a seductive fallacy. I demonstrate this by considering five versions of the argument; as I show, each is (...) either unsound or lacks a troubling conclusion. (shrink)

Background This pilot study evaluated the speaking book ‘What it means to be part of a clinical trial’. The book aims at empowering populations with information on their rights and responsibilities when enrolled in clinical research. Wide publication of the book—at significant cost—is anticipated. It is important that the book is evaluated within the communities for whom it is intended, and the necessary changes (if any) are made, before translation and large-scale publication takes place. Objective The objective of the study (...) was to measure the efficacy and ease of use of the book. Methods Participants were recruited from a catering company. Participants were questioned on their knowledge of clinical trials and were then given the book. Instructions for use of the book were given to one group (‘experimental’ group). The other group (‘control’ group) was not given any instructions. A week later, the investigators returned, repeated the knowledge questions and asked ‘ease of use’ questions. Results A two-way repeated measure of covariants showed a statistically significant positive increase in knowledge of clinical trials among the intervention group (p=0.02). Results for the control group displayed trends that were not statistically significant. Percentage analysis of ‘ease of use’ questions proved that the book is easy to use, although some changes would be beneficial. Conclusion This study revealed that the speaking book is easy to use. It significantly increased knowledge of clinical trials among the study sample if instructions on use of the book were provided. (shrink)

I would like to begin with the role of philosophy in solving ecological problems, emphasizing two aspects of its role: the struggle against hostile ideology and the organizing and guiding of activity in the sphere of the development of science and the shaping of its problems. This role of Marxist-Leninist philosophy clearly appears in the complex interdisciplinary problem of the interaction between nature and society.